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1 
The digital phenotype: a philosophical and ethical exploration 1 
The concept of the digital phenotype has been used to refer to digital 2 
data prognostic or diagnostic of disease conditions. Medical conditions 3 
may be inferred from the time pattern in an insomniac's tweets, the 4 
Facebook posts of a depressed individual, or the web searches of a 5 
hypochondriac. This paper conceptualizes digital data as an extended 6 
phenotype of humans, that is as digital information produced by 7 
humans and affecting human behavior and culture. It argues that there 8 
are ethical obligations to persons affected by generalizable knowledge 9 
of a digital phenotype, not only those who are personally identifiable 10 
or involved in data generation. This claim is illustrated by considering 11 
the health-related digital phenotypes of precision medicine and digital 12 
epidemiology.  13 
 14 
 Introduction 15 
 16 
This paper proposes a conceptual revision of the concept of the digital phenotype, which has 17 
recently been introduced in epidemiology to indicate human digital footprints with diagnostic and 18 
prognostic value (Jain et al. 2015). For example, the content and time pattern in a person’s tweets 19 
can indicate whether she suffers from insomnia, Facebook posts are considered to be depression 20 
symptoms (Jain et al. 2015) and could possibly be used in predicting suicidal tendencies (Kelion 21 
2017). It is common to classify some information comprising the digital phenotype as health-22 
related even if it is not health information in the customary sense.1  23 
The goal of this paper is to explore the ethics of the digital phenotype, which is relevant 24 
for the ethical assessment of data governance in personalized medicine and public health. Due to 25 
its normative focus, it speaks to an intended audience of bioethicists, political philosophers and 26 
scholars dealing with the regulation of new technologies. As it develops a concept that was drawn 27 
from evolutionary biology and repositioned at the boundary between epidemiology and 28 
information studies, it intersects the interests of philosophers of technology, philosophy of science 29 
                                                     
1 I wish to thank Prof. Ernst Hafen, who inspired me to work on this topic, participants to the ethics panel of the 
MyData 2017 Conference (Tallin-Helsinki) and Oliver Paul-Dehaye, for co-organizing that panel and providing 
feedback on a previous draft of this article. Special gratitude is owed to the two anonymous reviewers of this 
journal, who enriched the paper with their inputs, and in several rounds of review very patiently helped me to give 
shape to these views and to remove at least the worst sources of unclarity. All remaining problems in the paper are 
solely the author’s responsibility.    
Manuscript (without any authors' affiliations) Click here to download Manuscript (without any authors'
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2 
and scholars of science and technology studies. The paper goes beyond the concept of digital 1 
phenotype in the literature by considering how data shapes the human environment and is 2 
involved in feedback loops. For example, Facebook software architectures affect real-world 3 
friendship and Twitter metrics are perceived to be symbols of popularity and prestige, thus 4 
affecting actual popularity and prestige.2 Thus we need to ask how persons are influenced by 5 
health-related digital phenotypes (indirectly, through the beliefs, behaviors and norms the data 6 
supports), even if they are not identifiable in the data or involved in its production. Moreover, we 7 
need to consider differences between digital phenotypes emerging in different ways.  8 
The paper is structured as follows: 9 
In section 1 I define my purported revision of the original concept of the digital phenotype, 10 
introduced in the literature as an extension of Dawkins’ theory of the extended phenotype. I 11 
explore several facets of the analogy between digital data and the extended phenotype of non-12 
human organisms, such as termite nests or beaver dams, while discussing similarities and 13 
differences between the two realms. I argue that the analogy with the extended phenotype of social 14 
animals can be insightful in ways that have not been fully appreciated by the scholars responsible 15 
for introducing the concept in the literature. In section 2 I discuss two moral frameworks on the 16 
issue of control of digital information: one revolves around personal data protection as an aspect 17 
of dignity and the other one on data ownership as an extension of self-ownership. I identify the 18 
limits of each approach in dealing with certain types of data-ethics questions. In section 3 I describe 19 
some governance problems concerning the data generated in the context of so-called personalized 20 
medicine and data from internet platforms used in digital epidemiology.  21 
This article’s contribution to philosophy and ethics is twofold: it criticizes and friendly 22 
amends the only conception of the digital phenotype in the literature and analyses two ethical issues 23 
that are relevant to the governance of health-related data.  24 
 25 
1. What is the digital phenotype? 26 
 27 
1.1. The definition of the digital phenotype 28 
The concept of digital phenotype has been introduced in the literature as an extension of Richard 29 
Dawkins’ theory of the extended phenotype (Dawkins 1999, chap. 11). The extended phenotype 30 
                                                     
2 Twitter followers include bots (software programmed by paid professionals) whose goal is to enhance the 
perception of popularity of politicians, celebrities and companies (Freelon 2014). Freelon cites the so-called “Karpf’s 
rule”: “any metric of digital influence that becomes financially valuable, or is used to determine newsworthiness, will 
become increasingly unreliable over time”. See David Karpf, “Social Science Research Methods in Internet Time,” 
Information, Communication & Society 15, no. 5 (June 1, 2012): 650. 
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of an organism can be understood as the transformations it produces in its environment that 1 
influence its Darwinian fitness (i.e. the likelihood of transmitting its genes to the next generation). 2 
For example, beavers build dams, spiders build nets, bees build beehives, termites their nests, and 3 
earthworms modify the soil in which they live, in ways beneficial to their survival and reproduction. 4 
The digital phenotype – as understood here – is fundamentally a human phenomenon. 5 
Humans modify their online environment, leaving traces of themselves while interacting with an 6 
ever-expanding network of digital sensors placed by themselves or other humans. They produce 7 
the infrastructure by virtue of which all digital information is generated. They use digital data as a 8 
means to, or as a way of, exercising their species-typical capabilities (not only biological ones like 9 
survival and reproduction, but also those enabled and defined by human culture). Finally, (most) 10 
humans aim to control digital information in order to derive benefits from it. 11 
I focus on the ethological meaning of Dawkins’ concept – the importance of considering 12 
environments as extensions of individual phenotypes – while bracketing its genetic reductionism. 13 
The range of online behaviors that can be explained by invoking genetic influences is, plausibly, 14 
quite limited. Most behaviors, beliefs and social norms that influence digital information are too 15 
complex and sophisticated to be explained by exclusively biological, or even more narrowly 16 
genetic, causes. Likewise, the behaviors, beliefs and social norms affected by digital information 17 
are not reducible to the biological or genetic level of explanation. My emphasis here will be on the 18 
co-evolution of cultural entities (in the broadest possible sense) and data-shaped environments. 19 
 Hence, I propose to characterize the human digital phenotype as an assemblage of information 20 
in digital form, that humans produce intentionally or as a by-product of other activities, and which affects human 21 
behavior. More succinctly (but less precisely), the human digital phenotype consists of digital 22 
information produced by humans and affecting humans. 23 
 24 
1.2. Similarities and differences between the human digital phenotype and the extended phenotypes of other 25 
organisms 26 
 27 
Let us begin by considering a similarity between the way humans shape their digital environment, 28 
and soil invertebrates as ecosystem engineers. The ecological significance of invertebrates such as 29 
earthworms, termites and ants is not reducible to their contribution to the food chain; rather, it 30 
also involves their responsibility “for altering ecosystem dynamics through the modification, 31 
maintenance and/or creation of habitats for other organisms in the ecosystem” (Jouquet et al. 32 
2006, 154). Social insects such as termites and ants, for example, create structures (e.g. the 33 
termitarium and anthill) which are key to their adaptation to the external environment. For example, 34 
  
4 
the termitarium is formed by very cohesive soil, built in such a way to prevent water flux and ants 1 
into the nests, and designed to maintain appropriate levels of moisture. On the other hand, all their 2 
biological characteristics are adapted to their extended phenotype. The biological success 3 
(Darwinian fitness) of social insects – the likelihood of transmitting their genes to the next 4 
generation – would be different for the organism considered in isolation from the nest. The 5 
creation of such specialized environments and the transmission of genetic information form a 6 
feedback loop: different selective forces would be in place if these organisms could no longer 7 
produce nest structures, and the evolution of these species would take a different course, 8 
genetically and morphologically (Jouquet et al. 2006, 160).  9 
Consider now digital data as a human extended phenotype. First, digital information also 10 
causes transformations of the immediate environment in which humans pursue their goals. Information 11 
collected, aggregated, linked and made accessible in digital form affects cognition and motivation, 12 
facilitating the spread of certain beliefs, behaviors and social norms, and hindering or slowing 13 
down the spread of others. Behaviors, beliefs and norms, in turn, affect the ways in which humans 14 
pursue their goals and at the same time redefine the nature of these goals.3 Secondly, as in social 15 
invertebrates (but unlike, say, spiders) a significant part of the human digital phenotype arises from 16 
social coordination, not from the solitary action of isolated individuals.  17 
[Insert Fig. 1 here, smallest size compatible with visible print] 18 
Figure 1. Analogies between the extended phenotypes of spiders and humans. Built with Apple Keynote 8.0.1, except for web image, by Denis 19 
Frezzato, from The Noun Project, CC BY 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=24126123 20 
Let us now focus on the disanalogies between humans and much simpler animals (fig. 1). 21 
The level of evolution influenced by the digital phenotype is mainly cultural evolution. The 22 
capabilities by virtue of which humans shape their digital environment would not exist without the 23 
information contained in both genes and in cultural forms (e.g. culturally transmitted know-how). 24 
The motivation to generate digital information is not explained exclusively by genetically 25 
determined goals, such as survival and reproduction. Culturally defined goals (such as friendship, 26 
creative self-expression, political ideas) are equally if not more important. In spite of the higher 27 
complexity of human evolution, the analogy with other extended phenotypes retains its heuristic 28 
value: humans are also involved in evolutionary feedback loops with their data on both a faster 29 
(cultural) evolutionary scale and a slower (genetic) one. In both humans and many complex non-30 
human organisms, evolution involves different levels. These levels are not independent but 31 
interdependent, since genetics affects culture and culture affects genetics. This interdependence 32 
                                                     
3 These feedback loops take place across the offline-online boundary. The philosopher Luciano Floridi uses the 
concept of onlife to indicate the porous nature of the offline-online boundary (Onlife initiative 2015). 
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has been explored in both biology and anthropology (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Jablonka 1 
and Lamb 2005), but it is too complex to be considered here in relation to data, so I will focus on 2 
the cultural level in isolation from the evolution of the genome. (Notice that only the feedback 3 
loop of human cultural evolution is represented on the right-hand side in fig. 1.)  4 
 A biological metaphor that serves a similar heuristic function as that of a (digital) extended 5 
phenotype is Deborah Lupton’s concept of digital assemblages as a “digital companion species” 6 
(Lupton 2016a), in Donna Haraway’s sense (Haraway 2008). For Haraway, technologies are a 7 
companion species of humans in the sense that they co-evolve through mutual influences. As 8 
Lupton observes, such exegesis applies to digital data, where mutual influences between biological 9 
life and the data it generates are also the norm:  10 
 11 
Just as digital data assemblages are comprised of specific 12 
information points about people’s lives, and thus learn 13 
from people as algorithmic processes manipulate this 14 
personal information, people in turn learn from the 15 
assemblages of which they are a part (Lupton 2016a, 2). 16 
 17 
Both concepts can serve the same heuristic function, as they both highlight the co-evolution and 18 
feedback loops in which data are involved. The concept of a companion species is clearly applied 19 
metaphorically to digital data. Arguably, however, also the concept of the digital phenotype involves 20 
a non literal extension of the original (gene-centric) concept found in Dawkins. The “companion 21 
species” metaphor is a post-human metaphor which treats data as if it were itself a living species 22 
(Haraway 2008), while the digital phenotype idea places humans at the center, both ontologically 23 
and ethically, of a data-reality ecosystem.  24 
 25 
1.3 Why the extended phenotype analogy is a better analogy than a family of other (widely abused) 26 
biological analogies 27 
 28 
If the above account is correct, digital information can be considered an extended phenotype not 29 
only because, irrespective of its original purpose, it may reveal the (for instance, health-related) 30 
conditions of the persons it is about, but also in virtue of how it retroacts on them and other 31 
people. The metaphor of a termite nest is more suitable than others such as footprints, traces, tracks 32 
to convey this message. The footprint metaphor suggests a one-to-one correspondence between, 33 
for instance, a bear’s footprint and a bear’s foot. In these abused metaphors, there is no hint to 34 
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the fact that the human digital phenotype is a collective creation, involved in social feedback loops. 1 
The following section explains why personal data and libertarian moral frameworks are silent on 2 
some social implications of generating a digital phenotype.  Section three presents governance 3 
issues independent from personal data protection and ownership and related to the effects of 4 
creating a digital phenotype. 5 
2. The ethics of the digital phenotype 6 
 7 
One of the most important normative questions concerning the digital phenotype concerns who 8 
ought morally to control it. Different moral frameworks attribute importance to different relations 9 
between agents and data. Here I will analyze two influential moral frameworks, one focused on 10 
the protection of the dignity of identifiable individuals and the second on libertarian ownership of 11 
the data by individuals. I will explain why these frameworks have limits – there are ethical 12 
considerations outside the scope of these theories which are nonetheless ethically important. This 13 
analysis helps one to identify the new governance problems examined in section three, arising in 14 
personalized medicine and digital epidemiology.    15 
The first influential framework analyzed here focuses on the dignity of the person identified 16 
by data. The idea of human dignity is particularly influential in human rights discourse (Griffin 17 
2008, chap. 2), including the right to privacy (Floridi 2016a). Arguably, it received its first modern 18 
expression in the work of Pico della Mirandola (an early Renaissance philosopher) and later, a 19 
transcendental reformulation through the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Griffin 2008, chap. 2). 20 
The second considers data ownership as a natural extension of self-ownership. The libertarian 21 
conception of (moral) property rights as grounded in self-ownership found its most influential 22 
expression in John Locke’s political philosophy and is still widely influential in that branch of 23 
philosophy. 4   24 
In what follows, I will highlight features of the digital phenotype – in particular its ability 25 
to impinge on the lives of persons who are not identifiable in the data and do not contribute to its 26 
production – as a lens to highlight the shortcomings of these two ways of thinking about data.  27 
  28 
2.1 The limits of the personal data protection approach 29 
  30 
                                                     
4 They do not exhaust the range of possible moral theories (or even of European Enlightenment-inspired moral 
theories). For example four-principlism (Beauchamp and Childress 1994) is influential in bioethics and can be 
stretched to develop an ethics of health-related data (Mittelstadt 2017a).  
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The personal-data approach is most influential in data protection and privacy law. The EU’s 1 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), for example, affords special protection only to 2 
personal data, defined as data about an identified or identifiable individual. This is reasonable in so far as 3 
an identifiable individual is, generally speaking, more likely to suffer as a result of misuses of the 4 
data, for instance in that she can become the target of discrimination. However, a person’s dignity 5 
can also be affected by the generation of digital phenotypes that are not personal data of that 6 
individual, as I will now show.  7 
 Consider the genotyping of an ethnic group, for example the Maori, the indigenous 8 
Polynesian people of New Zealand. In 2006 a team of geneticists analyzed the presence of known 9 
variants of a gene for MAO (monoamine oxidase), as a marker for alcohol and tobacco 10 
dependence, in a group of Maori research subjects. A genetic variation in the metabolism of MAO 11 
is also statistically associated with aggressive behavior, lack of self-control, and risk taking. The 12 
science writer Ann Gibbon tagged the MAO gene as the “warrior gene” (Perbal 2013). It turns 13 
out that that specific gene was present in 56% of the Maori’s sample, with an even greater 14 
frequency in a sample of people who have Maori great-grandparents. This is a sensitive issue in so 15 
far as it reinforces the stereotype of the violent Maori, that is already widespread (Perbal 2013).  16 
In the genetic case, a digital phenotype (genomic data in digital form) can become a threat 17 
to the dignity of Maori individuals, who are potentially negatively affected by stigmatization or 18 
discrimination, by virtue of an association with a stereotype of violence. In the worst-case scenario, 19 
some individuals may think that these genetic data provide a justification for discrimination on an 20 
ethnic basis. Among the potential victims, one may find individuals whose personal data were not 21 
used in the research in question, who are not identifiable in the data and thus outside the scope of 22 
the data protection framework. Yet their dignity is arguably threatened by the risk of 23 
discrimination. 24 
It may be observed that a lot of instruments exist to empower genetically related groups 25 
(or entire genetically related populations) to control their data.5 But notice that this does not detract 26 
from my main claim in this section, which is that, for the sake of data protection, such instruments are 27 
not called for.  28 
The objection, moreover, invites a useful clarification between the rationale sometimes 29 
offered for the collective governance of genomic resources and the more general argument used 30 
here. It is often pointed out that genetic information is shared (in different degrees) across 31 
                                                     
5 For example, the “biotrust model” has been proposed to govern genetic biobanks (David E. Winickoff and 
Winickoff 2003; D. E. Winickoff and Neumann 2005), the solidarity model for research biobanks (Prainsack and 
Buyx 2013). 
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bloodlines, which entails that the genetic information about a person may also tell us something 1 
about his family members and, more broadly, ethnic group. A version of this argument can also 2 
be used to justify the collective governance of genetic databases for populations sharing a common 3 
ancestry.6 One is tempted to conclude that the justification of non individualistic forms of governance 4 
is essentially connected with the allegedly special nature of genetic information, namely its being 5 
shared (in variable degrees) between individuals with the same genetic ancestry. This may suggest 6 
that collective governance is not needed for non-genetic information.  7 
The genetic relatedness argument is, however, a red herring, because virtually any kind of 8 
generalizable knowledge (results that can be generalized to a larger population beyond the site of 9 
data collection or population studied), genetic or not, exposes individuals who are not research 10 
subjects to risks of harm. For example, knowing that smoking increases cancer risk (generalizable 11 
knowledge) enables an observer to infer sensitive features of individuals (e.g. cancer risk), from 12 
their public features (e.g. smoking). Thus, generalizable knowledge exposes all smokers to higher 13 
prices by insurance companies. One ought to take notice of the fact that generalizable knowledge 14 
exposes smokers to be harmed by insurance discrimination, independently from their contributing 15 
the data. The analysis of the digital phenotype can uncover new relations between data, creating 16 
several new groups of potentially affected parties: 17 
Think of the owners of such and such kind of car, shoppers of such and such kinds 18 
of goods, people who like this type of music, or people who go to that sort of 19 
restaurant, cat owners, dog owners, people who live in a specific postal code, 20 
carriers of a specific gene, people affected by a particular disease, team fans  (Floridi 21 
2016b, 97).  22 
The general phenomenon here is that generalizable knowledge from digital phenotypes enables 23 
some agents to discriminate against (or in favor of) some individuals.7 Here I am using 24 
‘discrimination’ as a morally neutral term, meaning that benefits are offered, or penalties imposed, 25 
on some people but not others, on account of some differences between them. And clearly not all 26 
forms of discrimination are equally morally objectionable – some are arguably justified all things 27 
considered. So, for example, even if a minority of smokers (those who are unable to quit smoking) 28 
are harmed by higher insurance prices which can be imposed on them, generally the information 29 
that smoking causes cancer is beneficial to them, because, for example, it enables them to make 30 
informed decisions, for example to quit smoking or buy life insurance. On the other hand, in the 31 
                                                     
6 This is suggested by indicating shared traits of the genome as part of the reasons to adopt a biotrust model (D. E. 
Winickoff and Neumann 2005, 9). A similar line of argument appears in (Widdows 2013, chap. 3). 
7 Floridi’s account of this issue describes the problem as one of group privacy (Floridi 2016b, 2014). My treatment makes 
no such commitment. 
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case of research about a ‘warrior gene’, ‘homosexuality gene’ or ‘race and IQ’, the balance between 1 
the social value of generalizable knowledge and the risk of discrimination for individuals may be 2 
tilted against the generation or diffusion of such knowledge (more on this in section 3.1).  3 
This section has identified a fundamental moral limit of the personal data protection 4 
framework: the possibility of discrimination harm due to generalizable knowledge, for persons 5 
who are not identified by the data, which the data protection framework is not equipped to solve. 6 
The general implication of this problem is that persons can be affected (in some cases, in dignity-7 
violating ways) by generating new digital phenotypes, irrespective of whether they are identifiable 8 
in it. It is important to notice that the moral problem of generalizable knowledge concerns all 9 
scientific knowledge, but it arises in a peculiar form for analyzes of the digital phenotype. As 10 
discussed in section 3, this is the case for at least two reasons: first, the number and granularity of 11 
the affected groups can be higher, for example specific risks may be identified for the profile of a 12 
mother, age group 30-40, of Native American ancestry, commuting at night hours. Second, this 13 
knowledge may only be captured as a complex mathematical function describing the behavior of 14 
nodes in a neural network, not in a more transparent knowledge form. 15 
 16 
2.2 The limits of the libertarian approach 17 
 18 
One feature of the personal data protection framework is that the person who produced 19 
the data matters morally only if that person is identifiable in the data. One plausible alternative is 20 
that she matters because of her data contribution, irrespective of identifiability. This ethical belief 21 
can be justified by appealing to (politically) libertarian moral principles. Libertarian philosophers 22 
have argued that initial (moral) ownership rights are grounded in (moral) self-ownership: the natural 23 
right that each individual has to use his own body the way one wishes, except in violent ways, 24 
against others  (Cohen 1995, 292). The purpose of this section is to highlight some difficulties in 25 
the application of a libertarian political framework to the digital phenotype. 26 
Libertarian ideas of self-ownership can be extended to data based on the idea of 27 
information as an extension of the self. This intuition is nicely captured by Floridi (who, however, 28 
does not defend a libertarian view of moral rights to data), when he points out that: 29 
 30 
 “my” in “my data” is not the same “my” as in “my car”, it 31 
is the same “my” as in “my hand”, because personal 32 
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information plays a constitutive role of who I am and can 1 
become (2016a, 308).8  2 
 3 
Alternatively, libertarian rights could be extended to data, based on the analogy between data 4 
production and human labor. In a libertarian perspective, acting with one’s body on reality (labor) 5 
creates moral entitlements to resources that are not antecedently owned (Nozick 1974, 150–53). 6 
Suppose that an astronomer records information about the movements of a distant star. These 7 
will be her data because, first of all, no one had an antecedent title on the information (the data 8 
about the star did not exist before the astronomer recorded them); and, second, the astronomer 9 
created data with resources (let us suppose) that she was morally entitled to use: her own body and 10 
legitimately owned scientific instruments. The astronomer morally owns the data she has produced 11 
and has the moral right to do whatever she wants with it. 12 
The libertarian theory applied to digital phenotypes faces (at least) two problems of internal 13 
consistency. The first is that there are two equally plausible rationales for initial property in 14 
information, which can conflict: self-extension and labor.  The person who generates the data 15 
(relevant for the ownership via labor analogy) can be different from the one the data are about 16 
(relevant for the self-extension analogy). Their self-ownership rights may conflict. Suppose that a 17 
shop owner had unrestricted ownership and control rights on the video recordings of his 18 
customers, deriving from the fact that he has recorded these videos (labor rationale). Some 19 
conceivable uses of the shop keeper’s libertarian ownership rights qua creators of the data (e.g. 20 
watching recordings of preferred female customers for the purpose of private entertainment) may 21 
be morally objectionable because they are violations of the customers’ privacy, which can also be 22 
interpreted as a violation of self-ownership (self-extension rationale).  23 
The second difficulty is that joint production of digital phenotypes, which is widespread, 24 
leads to joint ownership in them. Consider digital phenotypes that represent relationships between 25 
persons, e.g. online conversations between anonymous individuals, that clearly show how they 26 
relate to each other (e.g. politely, aggressively, etc.). Relations represented in the data are not about 27 
any individual in particular – they are about all participants to the conversation simultaneously and 28 
about no one specifically. From the point of view of the self-extension theory, the information 29 
about different individuals often overlap. If we are constituted by our data - if our data are not just 30 
our, but us - then we do not have mutually exclusive identities, even though we are materially 31 
                                                     
8 See also (Floridi 2011). Notice that Floridi here talks about personal information, e.g. a person’s Facebook profile is 
an extension of the self, but this is, arguably, not essential. I can recognize my informational extensions produced by 
participating to internet conversations in an anonymous form as mine, even though others cannot recognize me. 
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distinct individuals. Rather, as informational entities (Floridi 2011), we are, as it were, conjoined 1 
twins. Joint ownership and control models however create control problems for digital phenotypes 2 
derived from thousands of individuals. Joint ownership arrangement between thousands of, or 3 
more, individuals dilute control to such a degree that the value of ownership for the right holder 4 
is significantly reduced.     5 
Summing up: the personal data framework leaves persons helpless against the harmful 6 
effects of digital phenotypes formed by non-identifiable data. The libertarian theory cannot 7 
remediate this flaw because it often fails to provide clear cut criteria to distribute initial property 8 
rights or dilutes the value of these titles in a way that leads to ineffective control. In addition to 9 
these internal challenges, the libertarian theory does not solve the knowledge problem, the fact 10 
that knowledge may have benefits or harm persons who are not involved in the data generation. 11 
The conclusion is that we need to consider the consequences of digital information on all persons affected, 12 
including those affected by the beliefs, behaviors are norms supported (directly or indirectly) by 13 
digital phenotypes. The next section deals with this problem in the context of health. 14 
 15 
3 Governing the health-relevant digital phenotype  16 
Having identified the limits of the two moral frameworks of data protection and libertarian 17 
ownership, in this section I explore the implications of these limits for the health domain. The first 18 
case-study deals with governance of the digital phenotype of personalized medicine, focusing on 19 
the problem of harm due to generalizable knowledge (examined in general terms in 2.1). The 20 
second deals with the ethical obligations emerging from having a large power of creating and shaping 21 
a digital phenotype, a power that large internet corporations like Google and Facebook have. These 22 
examples illustrate the impact of technologies generating a digital phenotype, involved in 23 
evolutionary feedback loops (1.2), on persons who are not identifiable in it and have not 24 
contributed to its creation. This raises a governance problem about which personal data protection 25 
(2.1) or libertarian principles (2.2) offer no guidance.  26 
Before turning to the case studies, I now clarify the scope of this section of the paper, which 27 
deals with the health-relevant digital phenotype. A provisional and non-exhaustive list of data 28 
comprising the health-related digital phenotype includes (at least):  29 
- data produced in the contexts of disease surveillance, immunization records, public health 30 
reporting, vital statistics and registries (Vayena, Dzenowagis, and Langfeld 2016);  31 
- web data (including social media data, e.g. Twitter data), e.g. the time pattern in an 32 
insomniac’s tweets, the Facebook posts of a depressed individual, or the web searches of 33 
a hypochondriac (Jain et al. 2015); 34 
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- lifestyle data (e.g. as data coming from loyalty cards, location data from computer apps and 1 
mobile phones) (Vayena et al. 2015; European Commission DG Health 2014); 2 
- data parameters such “as heart rate, respiration, blood oxygen saturation, skin temperature, 3 
blood glucose, blood chemistry, and body weight […] collected alongside behavioural 4 
parameters (e.g. motion, acceleration, mood)” (Mittelstadt 2017b), by health monitoring 5 
smart phones application “that can track exercise or movement and share data with health 6 
professionals and other third parties” (Mittelstadt 2017a, 17) or by other Internet of Things 7 
(IoT) devices, including ambient assisted living devices (“smart home” or “ageing at home” 8 
applications, including smart pillboxes and fall detectors), “wearable, embedded and 9 
implantable sensors” and “semi-permanent sensors [which] can also be woven into clothes 10 
or wristbands for physiological measurements, including detection of specific molecules in 11 
perspirations […] or motion metrics to monitor Parkinson’s disease” (Mittelstadt 2017a, 12 
17); 13 
- data generated by IT platforms for disease surveillance (e.g. fluenearyou.org) (Vayena et 14 
al. 2015, 7); 15 
- molecular data from research in genomics and other so-called –omics (metabolic, 16 
proteomic, microbic information), as well as medically applied translational genomics  17 
(Vayena, Dzenowagis, and Langfeld 2016; Hood, Lovejoy, and Price 2015; National 18 
Academy of Sciences 2011). 19 
Notice that the health-relevant digital phenotype is not limited to health data, even on a broad 20 
construction of the latter notion. It clearly encompasses information that is not medical 21 
information in the narrow sense of information “gathered by physicians or other members of the 22 
medical team” (WMA - The World Medical Association 2016). The health-related digital phenotype 23 
also encompasses information produced by “individuals themselves via social media, fitness 24 
trackers, remote sensors, and the Internet of things”, which, it has been argued, will be very 25 
relevant for health-care (Aicardi, Del Savio, Dove, Lucivero, Mittelstadt, et al. 2016, see also 26 
Aicardi, Del Savio, Dove, Lucivero, Tempini, et al. 2016). A broader concept than that of medical 27 
information is that of “data concerning health”, as defined by Article 4(15) of the GDPR, which 28 
refers (according to recital 35) to information able to “reveal information about […] health status” 29 
(Regulation on the Protection  of Natural  Persons  with Regard  to the Processing  of Personal  Data and on the 30 
Free  Movement  of Such Data, and Repealing  Directive 95/46/EC  (General  Data Protection  Regulation 31 
2016/ 679) 2016). This includes information from social media, fitness trackers and remote 32 
sensors, whenever it is processed for health purposes (Mittelstadt 2017a, 2). The concept of the 33 
health-relevant digital phenotype is even broader than the concept of data concerning health. The 34 
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health-related digital phenotype, for example, includes anti-vaccination sentiments on social media. 1 
This is a health-related digital phenotype, because it can be studied by public health scholars to 2 
understand opposition to vaccination, which is useful for planning vaccination campaigns (Salathé 3 
and Khandelwal 2011). But, in many cases, it is not made of ‘data concerning health’, in the GDPR 4 
sense, because such data may not be processed to infer the health status of any natural person. 5 
The distinction between medical data, data concerning health, and the health-related digital 6 
phenotype is a meaningful one and worth preserving, in that there might be ethical arguments that 7 
apply specifically to medical data, in the narrow sense, e.g. confidentiality in the doctor-patient 8 
relationship, but not to other instances of the broader concepts. The health-related digital 9 
phenotype is the broadest concept and the ethical questions concerning it are more general than 10 
questions concerning medical data or data concerning health.  11 
 12 
Case study 1. P4 medicine  13 
 14 
Section 2.1 has identified the limits of the personal data and ownership frameworks in 15 
relation to the human digital phenotype, namely the fact that these frameworks do not protect 16 
persons who are not identifiable in the digital phenotype or involved its generation. Here I explore 17 
some ethical issues related to a digital phenotype produced in a specific medical context (P4 18 
medicine). Although this digital phenotype includes medical data in the narrow sense and data 19 
concerning health, here I consider only the ethical problems arising at the level of analysis of the 20 
health-related digital phenotype.  21 
So-called personalized, or P4 (predictive, preventative, participatory, and personalized) 22 
medicine aims to combine data from genomics, other molecular biomarkers (for example, 23 
epigenetic ones, see Relton and Davey Smith 2010), data from mobile sensors (e.g. GPS on patients 24 
smartphones) and self-monitoring (e.g. answers to online surveys), to obtain more fine-grained 25 
estimations of risk and tailored therapies for patients, often labelled ‘participants’ (Hood, Lovejoy, 26 
and Price 2015). Some proponents of this approach, more recently rebranded precision medicine, 27 
also include internet data and public health surveillance data about environmental or social risk 28 
factors (the “exposome”), among the possible sources from which a “Google map” of drivers of 29 
health and disease could be derived (National Academy of Sciences 2011, 19). The digital 30 
phenotype can be expanded further through patient/citizen participation, by eliciting data 31 
generation in a positive feedback loop involving virtual health/fitness coaches, that is, apps 32 
running on individual smartphones (Lupton 2016b, 2015). 33 
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In spite of the appellative ‘personalized’ often used to describe such applications, the 1 
improved ability to detect biomarkers and other data predictive of disease constitutes generalizable 2 
knowledge, knowledge that goes beyond the individual dimension. Potentially, patterns involving 3 
food consumption, cultural consumption, transportation, behavior on social networks, biometrics, 4 
psychometrics can be correlated with medical data, to make predictions about disease, health and 5 
wellness. The knowledge produced in this way is generalizable because it is applicable to other 6 
patients/clients beyond the ones contributing the data. Hence, the knowledge from data mining 7 
raises the ethical question of discrimination.  8 
This is, again, a general discrimination risk potentially generated by all forms of scientific 9 
discovery about humans, as shown by the example of the knowledge that smoking increases cancer 10 
risk, which leads to higher insurance prices for smokers (see section 2.1). As already discussed, this 11 
general discrimination risk alone does not make scientific discovery morally objectionable, all 12 
things considered. The moral reasons in favor of a discovery (e.g. the overall benefit for humanity 13 
of knowing that smoking causes cancer) can be much stronger than reasons against it, when there 14 
are only limited negative consequences for some groups (e.g. higher insurance prices for smokers 15 
unable to quit). In other cases, balancing the benefits of augmented knowledge with risks for 16 
specific group will be more difficult, as in the case of research on race and IQ, or research involving 17 
traits that are stigmatized in certain communities, such as sexual orientation. Even valid statistical 18 
results, extrapolated from their context, are liable to be misunderstood, and to reinforce bigoted 19 
prejudices that might harm such groups (Kitcher 2001, chap. 10; Buchanan 2007). As both cases 20 
illustrate, generalizable knowledge can be both beneficial and harmful for individuals who are not 21 
identifiable in the data or, more broadly, involved in their production (section 2). All generalizable 22 
knowledge has, potentially, these features. Yet, as I now briefly discuss, the ramifications of this 23 
problem in the context of P4 medicine pose special challenges for governance.  24 
First, in comparison to traditional, hypothesis-driven research, it is harder to identify groups 25 
harmed or benefited by knowledge from digital phenotypes. Thus, it is harder to identify the 26 
stakeholders. Normally big data are not studied for the sake of testing a limited set of hypotheses, 27 
identified prior to the data collection. Instead, algorithms are used to discover statistical 28 
correlations indicative of new hypotheses (Boyd and Crawford 2012). Moreover, predictions based 29 
on statistical correlations may be used in support of decision making. The study of hybrid digital 30 
phenotypes in precision medicine may provide decision makers outside health-care with more 31 
tools to make health predictions based on non-medical information. For example, companies may 32 
be tempted to use information from CVs or employee digital surveillance, which they legitimately 33 
collect, to predict the health prospects of applicants and employees and discriminate on that basis. 34 
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In some cases, such predictions may place special burdens on candidates of already disadvantaged 1 
ethnic groups and social backgrounds, including groups not involved in the initial data used to 2 
discover the correlations. In others, the discriminated groups may be individuals whose only 3 
meaningful association is the statistical one identified by the algorithm (Floridi 2016b, 88), lacking 4 
consciousness of themselves as a group. Hence, governance frameworks for digital phenotypes 5 
cannot be modelled after governance frameworks for genomic databases or biobanks relating to 6 
an antecedently well-defined populations (frameworks for genetic research on endangered 7 
populations or small nations).  8 
A second challenge derives from the opacity of some algorithms, such as neural nets, which 9 
are being increasingly used to discover relations between data (Mittelstadt et al. 2016; Danaher et 10 
al. 2017). When statistical generalizations about ethnic, gender or sexual preference groups are 11 
published in scientific papers, these claims tend to be carefully scrutinized during the peer review 12 
process. Controversial claims tend to attract the attention of the scientific community, which helps 13 
society to reduce the impact of the results affected by methodological problems and biases 14 
(Kitcher 2001). But with neural nets, no expert may actually be able to explain the scientific 15 
grounds behind the traits that are used to make health predictions (Mittelstadt et al. 2016). When 16 
the science behind the algorithm is a trade secret and the training data is not publicly accessible, it 17 
is more difficult to discuss human prejudices and flawed methods behind a predictive model.  18 
Summing up, data governance should consider not only the populations generating the 19 
digital phenotype, but all those that may be harmed or benefited by generalizable knowledge from 20 
the digital phenotype, for example in support of public health goals.9 Yet, such governance 21 
framework, involving stakeholders beyond digital phenotype creators, may be difficult to design 22 
and implement. There are trade-offs, for example, between the privacy (and ownership) rights of 23 
patients providing the data used to train algorithms and the public interest of society of 24 
understanding how predictive models are generated. Moral frameworks that are blind to the latter, 25 
or assign absolute priority to the former, may not be ethically adequate after all. 26 
 27 
Case study 2. Digital epidemiology and the use of internet data in public health 28 
 29 
This case study deals with the ethical obligations for those who have unusual powers to generate 30 
and control digital phenotypes. By using the digital phenotype as a conceptual frame of reference, 31 
I argue that internet giants have ethical obligations which derive from the potential of the data 32 
they generate to generate knowledge that is valuable for public health purposes.   33 
                                                     
9  This recommendation corresponds to ethical principle #1 in (Mittelstadt 2017a, 2).  
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Digital epidemiology (Salathé et al. 2012), also known as “infodemiology”, has been 1 
defined as “the science of distribution and determinants of information in an electronic medium, 2 
specifically the Internet, or in a population, with the ultimate aim to inform public health and 3 
public policy” (Eysenbach 2009, e11). Digital epidemiology produces knowledge by recycling the 4 
“data exhaust” from web activities, such as internet surfing or tweeting, that are anonymously 5 
released by their aggregators, or intended to be public. The knowledge produced in this way is an 6 
instance of how digital phenotypes can affect humans by influencing their beliefs, for example the 7 
beliefs of public health authorities about population health and health risks. 8 
The “parable of Google Flu” (Lazer et al. 2014) is a remainder of the fact that these 9 
platforms are not optimized to produce knowledge that serves the purposes of public health. 10 
Google Flu was the first widely influential project which repurposed internet data to serve public 11 
health goals. After one year of operation it became obvious that it was overestimating flu 12 
prevalence by a large margin. Part of the problem was that it was unable to discount for media-13 
induced flu panics, often related to the outbreak of unrelated epidemics (such as the bird flu or 14 
the swine flu). Furthermore, the analysis did not properly discount for a statistical artefact deriving 15 
from the way Google had collected the data (recording the search key selected after auto-complete 16 
suggestions by Google). This was amplified by changes in the Google auto-completion algorithm, 17 
aimed at presenting recommendations for flu treatments to users searching for typical flu 18 
symptoms (which are, however, compatible with common colds) (Lazer et al. 2014). The latter is 19 
an exemplary case of a platform effect (Malik and Pfeffer 2016), introducing biases in the data. 10 20 
There are two main lessons which can derived from this case. First, Google algorithms are 21 
optimized to serve Google’s goals as a company, not to collect information relevant to 22 
epidemiology. Second, the fact that Google kept its algorithm secret and Google researchers had 23 
access to non-public data (Ruths and Pfeffer 2014), by virtue of protecting the algorithm from 24 
external scrutiny, led to errors of greater proportions.  25 
Let us now consider Google’s data assets as a digital phenotype, that can only be produced 26 
thanks to the company and its successful product, but which can also affect the life of anyone 27 
affected by better public health measures. This view suggests that Google cannot focus solely on 28 
generating profit for its shareholders. Google has – it may then be argued – an ethical obligation 29 
to all persons potentially affected by its digital phenotype. This obligation can be conceptualized 30 
                                                     
10 another example of platform effect is  the “People You May Know” function in Facebook, which caused a spike 
in the observed rate of triadic closures (the phenomenon by which two nodes in a network are more likely to 
establish a link between each other if they each already share a link with another node) in Facebook friendships 
(Zignani et al. 2014). Platform effects are especially important for the epistemology of online sociology but they are 
problematic also for epidemiology.. 
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as a form of corporate social responsibility (Carroll 1991; Heal 2005); in this way – given Google’s 1 
favored position in the rank of internet powers – the idea of noblesse oblige is carried over to the 2 
ethics of big data regulation. In response to the problems analyzed here, large companies should 3 
strive, for example, to make data more openly accessible to researchers who could build the 4 
appropriate algorithms, so as to enhance the beneficial value of the data.  5 
Once again, notice that this ethical issue is not a concern from the standpoint of data 6 
protection or of the (libertarian) data ownership framework: first, the digital epidemiology uses 7 
anonymous data (e.g. frequency of aggregate searches of the word “flu”) where the likelihood of 8 
re-identifying individuals is very low, so the first is irrelevant; second, making data usable for public 9 
health is not something that Google owes to data co-generators (those using its search engine to 10 
make flu searches), but to all the persons potentially benefitted or harmed by this knowledge.   11 
 12 
Conclusions   13 
 14 
This essay contributes to philosophy and ethics by conceptualizing digital data as an extended 15 
phenotype and exploring the ethical implications of this idea. The digital phenotype is not an 16 
individual passive entity, as suggested by the digital footprint metaphor. It is a socially created 17 
causal factor in an evolutionary feedback loop, that can harm or benefit humans, by influencing 18 
their beliefs, behaviors and norms.  19 
The data protection and ownership frameworks assign a special moral importance, 20 
respectively, to identifiable individuals and those contributing data. By contrast, ethical reflection 21 
on the digital phenotype should highlight the risks and potential benefits of digital information for 22 
humans in general, including individuals and future generations, who are not identifiable in the 23 
data and did not contribute to it.  24 
Admittedly, section 3 does not provide ready-made solutions for the governance of the 25 
digital phenotype.  As shown by the case study of P4 medicine, identifying groups potentially 26 
affected by generalizable knowledge can be challenging in this context. Empirical sociology and 27 
informatics can help society to build methods to identify the at-risk groups and predict 28 
discrimination risks. Research in ethics and political philosophy should contribute to clarifying the 29 
balance between the social benefits and ills of generalizable knowledge; empirical testing and social 30 
experiments may lead to governance frameworks responsive to such concerns. A broader 31 
conversation with stakeholders, including but not limited to the clients of large internet companies, 32 
is needed to define the corporate social responsibility of large generators of digital phenotypes. 33 
 34 
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